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ABSTRACT. In this study, the author examined the relationship between theory-of-mind
understanding and preschool-aged children’s peer-related social competence. One hundred
eleven 3- to 5-year-old children (48 boys, 63 girls) participated in 2 theory-of-mind tasks
designed to assess their understanding of false belief. Teachers rated children’s peer-
related social behavior in terms of prosocial behavior, aggressive or disruptive behavior,
and shy or withdrawn behavior. Results indicated that, after controlling for age, theory-
of-mind understanding significantly predicted aggressive or disruptive behavior for boys
and prosocial behavior for girls. Theory-of-mind understanding also was related to lower
scores of shy or withdrawn behavior for boys. Results are discussed in terms of the
gender differences in the factors contributing to early peer competence.
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THE TERM THEORY OF MIND has been used to refer to the understanding that
the mental states of others in terms of beliefs, desires, and feelings may differ from
one’s own and that actions are often a product of those mental states (Wellman,
1990). The ability to represent mental states or have an understanding of the
thoughts, feelings, and desires of others can be seen as central to successful social
interactions. The early stages of children’s developing understanding of the mind
have received a great deal of attention over the past decade (see Wellman, Cross, &
Watson, 2001, for a review). Of particular interest has been the age at which chil-
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dren show an understanding of the relationship between the mental states of others
and their overt actions. Much of the empirical research in this area has focused on
age differences in performance on theory-of-mind tasks. Classic tests of false belief
have indicated that by about 4 years of age, typically developing children are able
to make inferences about the beliefs and desires of other people, to use this infor-
mation, and to interpret their behavior (Wellman, 1990, 1991; Wellman & Bartsch,
1994). Within the topic of children’s understanding of mental states, researchers
have been interested in the question of individual differences in children’s ability to
predict the behavior of others on the basis of their mental states. 
Researchers have examined individual differences in terms of the role played
by children’s early experiences, particularly social interactions, in facilitating the
development of children’s ability to conceive of actions as arising from mental states
such as beliefs. For example, family conversation patterns, which include discus-
sions about feelings, beliefs, intentions, desires, and other mental states, are associ-
ated with better performances on theory-of-mind tasks (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995;
Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla, & Youngblade, 1991; Dunn & Hughes, 1998).
The presence of siblings has been shown to contribute similarly to the rate at which
children are able to achieve success on false-belief tasks (Jenkins & Astington, 1996;
Peterson, 2000). Jenkins and Astington suggested that it may be the discussions of
different perspectives and disputes involving talk about causality between siblings
that enable children to increase their understandings of intentionality and the rela-
tionship between thoughts and behavior. 
Researchers have started to include the exploration of individual differences in
children’s understanding of theory of mind in an examination of the relationship
between children’s understanding of mental states and the ways in which they inter-
act with others. For example, the results of studies to assess children’s early emo-
tional understanding and affective perspective taking have indicated that high per-
formance on tasks that involve perspective-taking skills seems to be associated with
cooperative play behavior as early as 3 to 4 years of age (Dunn et al., 1991). The
ability to attribute mental states to others also has been linked to individual differ-
ences in early fantasy and pretence (Schwebel, Rosen, & Singer, 1999; Taylor &
Carlson, 1997). Associations also have been found between theory-of-mind ability
and the quality of children’s interactions with friends in terms of levels of conflict
and smooth communication (Dunn & Cutting, 1999), amount of time spent in explic-
it role assignment during pretend play, and ability to engage in joint planning of pre-
tend play with peers (Astington & Jenkins, 1995; Jenkins & Astington, 2000). Chil-
dren’s understanding of mental states also seems to play a role in the production of
prosocial behavior and the display of positive social skills (Dennis & Slaughter, 2000;
Watson, Nixon, Wilson, & Capage, 1999). These studies highlight the fact that com-
petent interactive behavior and mental state understanding are intimately related. 
Successful social relationships in the early years provide the opportunity for
increased learning about the relationships between thought and behavior. A devel-
oping understanding of the relationships between underlying mental states, such
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as beliefs and intentions, and overt behaviors have similar important conse-
quences for children’s ability to function successfully in their relationships with
their peers. The relationships that have been described between competent inter-
active behavior and mental state understanding have suggested that children who
are unable to understand that actions are the product of underlying mental states
may be less successful in their relationships with their peers. These children may
be at risk for ongoing peer relationship difficulties and consequent long-term
social adjustment problems. Thus, further investigation of qualitative individual
differences in theory-of-mind understanding is needed if the relationship between
theory-of-mind understanding and children’s social interactions can be more fully
understood. An understanding of false belief, emerging between 3 and 4 years of
age, seems to be a critical step toward a child’s coherent, conceptual understand-
ing of the mind. In this study, I investigated the relationships between measures
of peer-related social competence and success or failure on tasks related to this
specific aspect of mental state understanding. 
In the present study, I also explored the question of gender differences in the
relationship between theory-of-mind understanding and peer-related social compe-
tence. Most investigators who have studied individual differences in theory-of-mind
understanding have not addressed the issue of gender. However, several researchers
have suggested that gender differences exist in social–cognitive functioning. For
example, studies conducted with preschool children have indicated that there may
be important gender differences in the ways in which children think about social
problems and solve interpersonal conflicts (Miller, Danaher, & Forbes, 1986;
Musun-Miller, 1993; Walker, Irving, & Berthelsen, 2002). The social goals chosen
by children and the strategies that children select to achieve these goals are influ-
enced by the information accessed from the social environment, and the skill of
accurately determining another’s social intentions seems to be highly correlated
with social competence (Dodge & Feldman, 1990; Rubin & Krasnor, 1992). That
girls seem to be more competent overall in determining the intentions of others and
in generating effective solutions to social problems (e.g., Putallaz, Hellstern, Shep-
pard, Grimes, & Glodis, 1995) might suggest that they are more intuitive than boys
are. Charman, Ruffman, and Clements (2002), who found weak gender differences
in false-belief understanding for the younger cohorts in their sample of 3- to 5-year-
old children, provided some support for this proposition. Another important con-
sideration in this study was determining how any gender differences in mental state
understanding might be related to differences in peer-related social competence. 
Method
Participants
The sample consisted of 53 three- to four-year-old children (M age = 44.5
months, SD = 2.60) and 58 four- to five-year-old children (M age = 55.9 months,
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SD = 5.35) from four suburban, community-based, sessional community
preschools and kindergartens in Queensland, Australia. Community kinder-
gartens and preschools in Queensland are noncompulsory and enroll children
from 3 to 5 years of age before they enter formal school. The teaching staff con-
sists of qualified early childhood teachers who implement play-based curricula.
Each center that participated in the present study managed a 2-day kindergarten
program for 3- to 4-year-old children and a 3-day preschool program for 4- to 5-
year-old children. The 3- to 4-year-old sample included 25 boys and 28 girls and
the 4- to 5-year-old sample included 23 boys and 35 girls. 
Measures
Theory of mind. I gave children two standard false-belief tasks, which I acted out
with large dolls. The order of the tasks was counterbalanced across children. One
task consisted of a standard change-of-location task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, &
Frith, 1985). I introduced two dolls named Sally and Ann. Sally had a basket; Ann
had a box. Sally hid a marble in her basket and departed. While she was gone,
Ann moved the marble to the box. On Sally’s return, I asked the children a belief
question (“Where will Sally look for the marble?”) followed by two memory con-
trol questions (“Where is the marble now?” and “Where did Sally put the mar-
ble?”). To pass the task, children needed to correctly answer both control ques-
tions and demonstrate an understanding of false belief by correctly predicting that
Sally would look for the marble in the basket. 
The second task was a standard misleading container task with two compo-
nents (Perner, Frith, Leslie, & Leekam, 1989). I showed children a sweets box
that actually contained pencils and asked what they thought was inside. After I
showed them that the box contained pencils, I asked them, “When you first saw
the box, what did you think was inside?” This question required children to
remember a previous knowledge state that was different from their present knowl-
edge state and has been termed the representational change question (Watson et
al., 1999). I then introduced a new doll and asked the children, “What does Nicky
think is in the box?” (false belief of other question). To pass the task and demon-
strate an understanding of false belief, the children needed to be able to recog-
nize their own original false belief and understand the false belief of another per-
son by stating that Nicky would think that there were sweets in the box. I scored
these two questions as separate false-belief questions because, for each of the sce-
narios, the children had to recognize a belief that differed from reality.
I gave each correct response to each question a score of 2 and an incorrect
response to each question a score of 0. I analyzed children’s performance on indi-
vidual tasks and summed the responses to the two tasks, which resulted in a total
theory-of-mind score. Researchers have indicated that aggregating scores across
tasks is appropriate because of high correlations in children’s performance across
various theory-of-mind tasks (Slaughter & Gopnik, 1996; Watson et al., 1999).
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The total theory-of-mind scores ranged from 0 to 6.
Profile of Peer Relations (PPR; Walker, Berthelsen, & Irving, 2000). I asked
teachers at the children’s preschools to rate each of the participating children in
their kindergarten and preschool groups in terms of their peer-related social skills.
Teachers completed the 25-item PPR. The PPR includes (a) items that assess the
frequency of positive and negative play behaviors such as cooperative play, ver-
bal aggression, and physical aggression; (b) items that detail a variety of strate-
gies that children might use when attempting to gain entry into the play of other
children, some of which might be more successful than others; and (c) items relat-
ed to rate of engagement in conflict and conflict resolution strategies. I asked
teachers to rate the degree to which children displayed specific behaviors on a 4-
point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (rarely) to 4 (almost always). 
Walker et al. (2000) identified three factors in the measure, which they
labeled aggressive or disruptive behavior, prosocial behavior, and shy or with-
drawn behavior. They reported that the three factors demonstrated high internal
consistency (Cronbach’s α = .91, .86, and .59, respectively). Because the same
factor structure may not fit the data for different populations of children, I pre-
ferred to use a factor structure derived from my data. Therefore, I conducted a
factor analysis of the items to identify the relevant subscales for this sample. 
Results
Theory-of-Mind Tasks
Pearson correlations revealed a strong relationship between children’s per-
formance on each of the theory-of-mind tasks (see Table 1). This result is con-
sistent with previous findings (e.g., Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Taylor & Carl-
son, 1997). I examined gender and age group differences in performance on
theory-of-mind tasks using analyses of variance. The dependent measure was the
participant’s aggregate theory-of-mind score. Using Wilks’s Λ statistic, I found
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TABLE 1. Correlations Between Theory-of-Mind Tasks
Variable Change in location Unexpected contents (self)
Change in location — —
Unexpected contents (self) .40** —
Unexpected contents (other) .42** .58**
**p = .01 (two-tailed).
significant main effects for both gender, F(1, 110) = 4.93, p = .029, and age group,
F(1, 110) = 16.29, p = .000. I did not find significant interaction between age
group and gender. My examination of group means revealed that girls scored
higher than did boys on the total theory-of-mind score and that, as I expected, the
older age group had higher scores than did the younger age group (see Table 2). 
Profile of Peer Relations
Principal axis factor analysis. I confirmed the subscale structure of the measure
with a principal axis factor analysis of the 25 items on the PPR. A 3-factor solu-
tion with orthogonal varimax rotation afforded the simplest, interpretable struc-
ture and explained 61% of the variance. Because of the sample size, I set a cut-
off level for factor loadings at .40 (Stevens, 1996). All items had a factor loading
that met this criterion. There was minimal cross loading of items across factors
with only two items loaded above .40 on two factors. The first item (shares, takes
turns) reflected an aspect of prosocial behavior and loaded at .68 on Factor 2
(including items that reflected prosocial behavior) and negatively at .48 on Factor
1 (including items that reflected aggressive and disruptive behavior). Therefore,
I included this item on Factor 2. The second item (gives in or minimizes own
requests in response to conflict) loaded at .64 on Factor 3 (including items that
reflected less assertive behavior) and negatively at .44 on Factor 1 (including
items that reflected aggressive and disruptive behavior). Therefore, I included this
item on Factor 3. Table 3 shows the factor loadings for each item, item com-
monalities, and percentage of variance accounted for by each factor. 
Factor 1 contained 9 items, which accounted for 22% of the variance and was
similar to Walker et al.’s (2000) factor of aggressive or disruptive behavior. Items
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TABLE 2. Means and Standard Deviations for
Theory-of-Mind (ToM) Tasks, by Gender and
Age Group
Aggregate ToM score
Gender M SD
3- to 4-year-olds (n = 53)
Boy (n = 25) 1.60 2.30
Girl (n = 28) 2.89 2.31
4- to 5-year-olds (n = 58)
Boy (n = 23) 3.65 2.14
Girl (n = 35) 4.23 1.99
loading on this factor reflected aspects of aggression, high engagement in con-
flict, aggressive conflict resolution strategies, and aggressive or disruptive group
entry strategies. Giving in to conflict loaded negatively on this factor. Factor 2
contained 10 items, which accounted for 19% of the variance and was similar to
Walker et al.’s factor of prosocial behavior. Items loading on this factor reflected
aspects of prosocial behavior, cooperative behavior, positive responses to conflict,
and competent group entry strategies. Factor 3 contained 6 items, which accounted
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TABLE 3. Principal Axis Factor Analysis With Varimax Rotation for Profile
of Peer Relationships (N = 111)
Item F1 F2 F3 h2
Factor 1: Aggressive or disruptive behavior 
(α = .91)
High rate of conflict with peers .88 0 –.13 .80
Threatens or insults peers .79 0 0 .65
Becomes physically aggressive in response to 
conflict .84 0 0 .76
Physical aggression (hits, pushes) .84 0 0 .70
Verbal aggression (teasing, name calling) .74 11 –.23 .61
Disruptive behavior .78 0 –.12 .63
Frowns, argues .64 –.15 –.15 .57
Attention seeking group entry approach .64 .13 –.37 .60
Disruptive group entry approach .72 .12 –.25 .64
Factor 2: Prosocial behavior (α = .89)
Compromises in conflict –.12 .72 .18 .58
Initiates and responds to conversation .13 .63 0 .57
Cooperative play 0 .81 0 .67
Small group intimate play .17 .80 0 .67
Shares, takes turns, helps –.48 .68 .21 .74
Laughs, smiles –.10 .69 –.24 .55
Group centered entry approach .12 .64 –.22 .59
Direct group entry approach .13 .64 –.23 .59
Successful entry attempts .11 .78 –.30 .72
Popular with peers .11 .68 –.16 .55
Factor 3: Shy or withdrawn behavior (α = .75)
Gives in or minimizes requests in conflict –.44 .11 .64 .64
Parallel play 0 0 .52 .28
Onlooker –.19 –.24 .74 .68
Alone occupied –.28 0 .48 .42
Alone unoccupied 0 –.15 .64 .54
Wait and hover entry approach 0 –.10 .82 .68
% of variance 22 19 12
Note. Boldface identifies items with factor loadings ≥ .40.
for 12% of the variance and was similar to Walker et al.’s factor of shy or with-
drawn behavior. Items loading on this factor included giving in or minimizing
requests in response to conflict; less socially interactive behaviors, such as par-
allel play, onlooker, and alone; and more passive group entry behaviors. I calcu-
lated factor scores by summing the ratings for the items defining each factor and
dividing by the number of items. Reliability (Cronbach’s α) of the factor scores
for aggressive or disruptive behavior, prosocial behavior, and shy or withdrawn
behavior was .91, .89, and .75, respectively, which confirmed the reliability of
this factor structure with the present sample. 
Gender and age group differences. To examine the influence of gender and
age group, I conducted a multivariate analysis of variance in which gender and
age group served as the between-group variables. The dependent measures
were the factor scores for aggressive or disruptive behavior, prosocial behav-
ior, and shy or withdrawn behavior. Table 4 shows means and standard devi-
ations relating to the dependent measures. Using Wilks’s Λ statistic, I found
significant main effects for gender, F(3, 105) = 8.24, p = .000, and for age
group, F(3, 105) = 12.67, p = .000. However, these main effects were quali-
fied by a significant Gender × Age Group interaction, F(3, 105) = 3.49, p =
.018. Analysis of the significant higher order interaction using follow-up uni-
variate tests revealed significant interactions for aggressive or disruptive
behavior, F(1, 110) = 8.60, p = .004, and shy or withdrawn behavior, F(1, 110)
= 5.20, p = .025. Figure 1 shows the Gender × Age Group interaction graph-
ically. Examination of group means indicated that older boys were more like-
ly than were younger boys to display aggressive or disruptive behavior and
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TABLE 4. Means and Standard Deviations for Profile of Peer Relationships,
by Gender and Age Group
Profile of Peer Relationships
Aggressive or Shy or
disruptive Prosocial withdrawn
Gender M SD M SD M SD
3- to 4-year-olds (n = 53)
Boy (n = 25) 1.40 .50 2.77 .61 2.07 .50
Girl (n = 28) 1.21 .37 2.67 .59 1.92 .59
4- to 5-year-olds (n = 58)
Boy (n = 23) 2.01 .73 3.20 .45 1.68 .41
Girl (n = 35) 1.24 .48 1.68 .41 1.95 .44
less likely than were younger boys to display shy or withdrawn behavior. This
pattern was not evident for girls.
Profile of Peer Relations and Theory of Mind
I used correlational analyses to examine the relationship between theory of
mind and teacher-rated social competence. Because of gender differences in theory
of mind and teacher-rated social competence, I carried out correlations for each gen-
der separately to determine whether the relationship between social competence,
age, and theory-of-mind understanding differed for boys and girls. Examination of
Pearson correlations revealed some moderately strong relationships between age,
theory-of-mind understanding, and teacher-rated social competence (see Table 5). I
found an expected positive relationship between theory-of-mind ability and age for
both boys and girls, which indicated that older children were more proficient on the
theory-of-mind tasks; however, the relationship was stronger for boys. For boys,
there was a significant positive relationship between theory-of-mind ability and
aggressive or disruptive behavior and a negative relationship between theory-of-
mind ability and shy or withdrawn behavior, which indicated that teachers rated boys
who were more proficient on theory-of-mind tasks as more likely to display aggres-
sive or disruptive behavior and less likely to display shy or withdrawn behavior. For
girls, there was a significant positive relationship between theory-of-mind ability
and prosocial behavior indicating that girls who were more proficient on theory-of-
mind tasks were more likely to display prosocial behavior.
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I tested the significance of the difference between these correlations for boys
and girls using Fisher’s z transformation. The difference between boys and girls
was significant for aggressive or disruptive behavior (z = 3.369) but not for proso-
cial (z = −0.743) or shy or withdrawn behavior (z = −1.374).
To test the relative contributions of age and theory-of-mind ability to peer-
related social competence, I performed a multiple regression analysis. Because
of the differential correlational relationships for each gender, I conducted the
regression analyses separately for boys and for girls. For boys, I entered age first
with teacher ratings of aggressive or disruptive behavior as the dependent vari-
able. Age accounted for 20% of the variance (R2adjusted = .19) and significantly
predicted teacher-rated aggressive or disruptive behavior, F(1, 46) = 11.635, p =
.001. I then entered total theory-of-mind score on the second step, which signif-
icantly added to the prediction of teacher-rated aggressive or disruptive behavior,
R2change = .09; F(1, 45) = 5.69, p = .021. The final regression equation accounted
for 29% of the variance (R2adjusted = .26) to significantly predict teacher ratings of
boys’ aggressive or disruptive behavior, F(2, 45) = 9.26, p = .000. 
For girls, I entered age first with teacher ratings of prosocial behavior as the
dependent variable. Age accounted for 23% of the variance (R2adjusted = .22) and sig-
nificantly predicted teacher-rated prosocial behavior, F(1, 61) = 18.403, p = .000. I
then entered total theory-of-mind scores on the second step, which significantly
added to the prediction of teacher-rated prosocial behavior, R2change = .06, F(1, 59)
= 5.43, p = .023. The final regression equation accounted for 29% of the variance
(R2adjusted = .28) to significantly predict teacher ratings of girls’ prosocial behavior,
F(2, 61) = 12.595, p = .000. Table 6 shows the results of the regression analyses. 
Discussion
In this study, I examined three main issues: (a) the nature of indivi-
dual differences in children’s peer-related social behavior, (b) the individual
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TABLE 5. The Relationship Between Age, Theory of Mind, and 
Teacher-Rated Social Competence
Theory-of-mind score
Variable Boy (n = 48) Girl (n = 63)
Aggressive or disruptive behavior .46** –.16
Prosocial behavior .26 .39**
Shy or withdrawn behavior –.37* –.17
Age .43** .30*
*p = .05 (two-tailed). **p = .01 (two-tailed).
differences in children’s understanding of theory of mind, and (c) the relation-
ship between these two variables. Overall, my results supported the notion that
individual differences in theory-of-mind understanding are related to important
aspects of social behavior; however, it also seems that this relationship differs
for boys and girls. 
Teacher-Rated Social Behavior
With respect to gender differences, teachers rated boys as more likely than
girls to engage in aggressive or disruptive behavior, although not less likely to
engage in prosocial behavior. Overall, these results provide support for the results
of other researchers. Both observational and teacher reports indicated that by the
age of 2 or 3 years boys consistently exhibited more physical and verbal aggres-
sion than did girls (Coie, Dodge, & Coppotelli, 1982; Maccoby & Jacklin, 1980;
Walker, 2004). With respect to age differences, both older boys and older girls
were rated as displaying more prosocial behavior than were younger boys and
younger girls; teachers also rated older boys as significantly more likely than
younger boys to engage in aggressive or disruptive behavior and less likely than
younger boys to display shy or withdrawn behavior. These age differences were
not evident for girls. 
Because of the cross-sectional nature of this study, I was not able to deter-
mine changes in social behavior over time; however, one could speculate that the
higher rates of aggressive or disruptive behavior and lower rates of shy or with-
drawn behavior displayed by older boys are an adaptive response to interactions
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TABLE 6. Predictive Models of Peer-Related Social Behavior
Regression model β R 2 ∆R 2
Boy (n = 48)
Criterion variable: Aggressive 
or disruptive behavior
Step 1: Age .449** .202**
Step 2. Theory-of-mind score .331* .291* .090*
Girl (n = 63)
Criterion variable: Prosocial
behavior
Step 1: Age .484** .235**
Step 2: Theory-of-mind score .266* .299* .064*
*p ≤ .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
within male peer groups. In other words, socialization to peer group norms dur-
ing the kindergarten year (3- to 4-year-old group) may act to discourage shy or
withdrawn behavior, whereas it may emphasize dominance as important for
young boys. Thus, overt aggression in conjunction with high levels of prosocial
behavior may be not only acceptable for boys at preschool age (4- to 5-year-old
group) but positively valued as a means of establishing their social position if it
is used in the service of standing up for themselves. In later school years, it is
likely that such overt aggressive behavior becomes nonnormative and that dom-
inance hierarchies are established more subtly.
Individual Differences in Theory of Mind
The developmental trends noted in my results are consistent with those obtained
by other researchers (e.g., Wellman et al., 2001). To be specific, older children—
both boys and girls—were more competent in their performance on the false-belief
tasks. The gender differences in theory-of-mind understanding were also in the
expected direction. Researchers have suggested that there may be important gender
differences in the ways in which children think about social problems and solve
interpersonal conflicts (e.g., Miller, Danaher, & Forbes, 1986; Musun-Miller, 1993;
Walker et al., 2002); however, few investigators have specifically examined gender
differences in theory-of-mind understanding. In one exception, Charman et al.
(2002) found weak gender differences in false-belief understanding in children of a
similar age to those in the present sample (3- to 5-year-old children). The gender
differences apparent in the present study supported and extended Charman et al.’s
findings and indicated that preschool-aged girls are more competent than are
preschool-aged boys on theory-of-mind tasks involving false belief. 
However, one of the limitations of the present study is that I did not include
a measure of receptive language ability. Because of the increasing evidence of
strong correlations between the ability to pass theory-of-mind tasks and oral lan-
guage competence (e.g., Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Cutting & Dunn, 1999;
Happé, 1995), the effect of verbal ability on the relationships reported here should
be investigated in follow-up studies. It is possible that the gender differences evi-
dent in the present study may be, at least in part, a reflection of girls’ greater facil-
ity with tasks related to oral language ability. 
Theory of Mind and Peer-Related Social Competence
Researchers have indicated that the development of theory-of-mind under-
standing is related to important aspects of social behavior (Astington & Jenkins,
1995; Dunn et al., 1991; Dunn & Cutting, 1999; Jenkins & Astington, 2000;
Schwebel et al., 1999; Taylor & Carlson, 1997). For example, success on false-
belief tasks has been linked to popularity with peers (Dennis & Slaughter, 2000)
and to the production of prosocial behavior (Watson et al., 1999). My results in
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the present study supported the previous work with respect to girls; however, I
did not expect the results for boys. To be specific, teachers rated boys who were
more proficient at false-belief tasks as more likely to engage in aggressive or
disruptive behavior. However, production of prosocial behavior was related to
theory-of-mind ability for girls. The present results therefore suggest that the rela-
tionship between theory-of-mind understanding and peer-related social compe-
tence is by no means straightforward. 
Development of the underlying cognitive ability to understand that others
have thoughts, feelings, desires, and intentions different from one’s self (theo-
ry of mind) may be related to social competence; however, it does not seem to
be necessarily related to the production of prosocial behavior. The notion that
theory-of-mind ability may be used to engage in either positive or negative
social interactions has been proposed with respect to peer-nominated contro-
versial children who engage in high levels of both positive and negative social
behaviors (e.g., Browitt & Sanderson, 2001). There is also some evidence that
manipulative ability, which implies a more advanced understanding of the
mind, is related to dominance in preschool-aged children (Keating & Heltman,
1994). Therefore, it is possible that the preschool-aged boys in the present
study who  showed evidence of a greater understanding of theory-of-mind abil-
ity may have been more likely to engage in behaviors that were socially suc-
cessful for boys in preschool settings. In support of this notion, older boys in
the present study displayed more prosocial behavior than did younger boys,
and they also displayed more aggressive or disruptive behavior and less shy or
withdrawn behavior. The significant differences between older and younger
boys with respect to aggressive or disruptive behavior and shy or withdrawn
behavior suggests that the higher rates of aggressive or disruptive behavior dis-
played by the older boys may be adaptive for preschool-aged boys. Researchers
who have studied preschool-aged children have indicated that, whereas aggres-
sion is linked to unpopular social status for preschool-aged girls, aggressive or
disruptive behavior does not seem to distinguish between social status groups
for preschool-aged boys (Walker et al., 2002). 
Howes (1988) defined social competence as behavior that reflects (a) ability
to socially function with peers, (b) ability to achieve personal goals, and (c) sen-
sitivity to peer communication. However, processing of social cues seems to be
related to the social context and the social partners available (Maccoby, 1990).
During the preschool years, gender identity and gender role preferences are under-
going rapid development as children gradually come to acquire the behaviors and
attitudes considered appropriate for their biological gender (Serbin, Powlishta, &
Gulko, 1993). Therefore, it is possible that competent behavior and successful
social cognitive functioning may be defined differently for boys and girls at
preschool age. Gender-specific behaviors and styles of social interaction may play
a role in the relationship between theory-of-mind ability and peer-related social
behavior in that the skills required, and the behaviors regarded as competent, may
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differ according to the social norms and expectations regarded as important for
boys or girls by their peers. Thus, as early as 4 or 5 years old, boys and girls may
have different profiles of socially competent behavior.
The participants in the present study attended community preschools and
kindergartens. These programs serve 3- to 4-year-old children in the kindergarten
program and 4- to 5-year-old children in the preschool program. Because of the
nature of these programs, it is likely that the kindergarten year was, for the major-
ity of children in the center, their first experience in a group setting. Therefore,
the higher rates of aggressive or disruptive behavior displayed by the boys in the
preschool program may be less a function of developmental factors than a result
of socialization into male peer groups within which more assertive, dominant
behavior may be effective and even positively regarded. 
Conclusion
The results of the present study emphasize the importance of gender as a
social category, which may not only influence the types of social–cognitive skills
that are relevant to social competence for boys and girls but also the social goals
that they select as important. The findings that the ability to understand false
belief, and thus demonstrate an understanding of theory of mind, was linked to
higher levels of aggressive or disruptive behavior for boys suggested that the
social goals selected by boys may be more related to dominance than concilia-
tion. The results indicated that any interventions aimed at improving children’s
ability to understand the mental states of others may not necessarily result in a
decrease of aggressive or disruptive behavior and a corresponding increase in
prosocial behavior. Thus, if interventions aimed at improving children’s peer-
related social competence are to be effective, there may be a need to combine
theory-of-mind training with training in positive prosocial behaviors and, perhaps
most important, a need to take children’s social goals into consideration. 
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